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NASA STI Program . . . in Profile
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the 
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The 
NASA scientific and technical information (STI) 
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role. 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. 
It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI 
program provides access to the NASA Aeronautics 
and Space Database and its public interface, the 
NASA Technical Report Server, thus providing one 
of the largest collections of aeronautical and space 
science STI in the world. Results are published in 
both non-NASA channels and by NASA in the 
NASA STI Report Series, which includes the 
following report types: 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
Programs and include extensive data or 
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data and 
information deemed to be of continuing 
reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers, but 
having less stringent limitations on manuscript 
length and extent of graphic presentations. 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 
and technical findings that are preliminary or of 
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, 
working papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION.  
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, seminars, 
or other meetings sponsored or co-
sponsored by NASA. 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, 
often concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION.
English-language translations of foreign 
scientific and technical material pertinent to 
NASA’s mission. 
Specialized services also include organizing  
and publishing research results, distributing 
specialized research announcements and feeds, 
providing information desk and personal search 
support, and enabling data exchange services. 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
• Access the NASA STI program home page 
at http://www.sti.nasa.gov
• E-mail your question to help@sti.nasa.gov
• Fax your question to the NASA STI 
Information  Desk at 443-757-5803 
• Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at  
443-757-5802 
• Write to: 
           STI Information Desk 
           NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 
           7115 Standard Drive 
           Hanover, MD 21076-1320
National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration 
Langley Research Center   
Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199  
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Appendix E. Tabulated Vortex-Induced Aerodynamic Coefficients 
and Component Loads
An independent analysis of the vortex induced aerodynamic loads on the Falcon 20 in the wake 
of the DC-8 was described in the main report.  A selected set of results are presented in Section 
7.2 for the most conservative DC-8 vortex induced effects on the Falcon 20, but many additional 
results for less conservative vortex characteristics were considered by the NESC team.  The 
complete set of results from the analysis is shown in this appendix. 
The following characteristics of the DC-8 apply to these results: 
Weight: 280,000 lb 
Altitude: 25,000 ft 
Mach number: 0.7 
Trailing vortex decay: none 
Trailing vortex core: 1%, 2%, and 3.5% of DC-8 wing span 
The digitized fuselage, wing, horizontal tail planform, and vertical tail planform used to model 
the Falcon for the aerodynamic analyses are shown in Figures E-1 through E-5. 
Figure E-1.  Digitized Falcon Fuselage Side View Model 
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Figure E-2. Digitized Falcon Fuselage Top View Model 
Figure E-3. Digitized Falcon Fuselage Top View Model 
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Figure E-4. Digitized Falcon Wing Planform Model 
Figure E-5. Digitized Falcon Vertical Tail Planform Model 
The NEAR STRLNCH and MISDL prediction methods were applied with the DC-8 modeled as 
the parent aircraft and the Falcon 20 modeled as the launched store.  The Falcon 20, in its heavy 
configuration of 31,900 lb, was trimmed under free-stream flight conditions.  It was then placed 
in a matrix of locations behind the DC-8, with each location defined by the (Y, Z) coordinates in 
the DC-8 system.  Note in the following figures that the Y coordinates are negative on the port 
side of the DC-8.  At each location in the DC-8 flow field, including all vorticity associated with 
the wing and tail loading, the Falcon 20 aerodynamic characteristics were computed without 
changing the trim configuration; therefore, the aerodynamic forces and moments shown are those 
induced by the DC-8 flow field. 
In the color contour maps shown below, the Falcon 20 nose placed at a point (Y, Z) in the DC-8 
flow field will produce the aerodynamic characteristic on the aircraft defined by the color bar at 
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the right of each map.  Note that the primary DC-8 vortex location (Y = –60, Z = 2) is shown as 
a white circle in each figure. 
Each set of contour maps for a specific flight condition requires more than 2,000 simulations, so 
the volume of the results considered by the NESC team is too large to include in tabular form.  
Each of the data sets used to make the contour maps shown in this appendix is available in digital 
format if specific results are required.  
The first contours shown are for the DC-8 trailing vortex with a core radius of 1 percent of the 
wing span (Figures E-6(a) through E-6(k).  For each case, the Falcon 20 vortex induced rolling 
moment, normal force, pitching moment, side force, and yawing moment coefficients are shown.  
The component normal force and root bending moment coefficients are shown for the vertical 
tail and the right and left horizontal tails. 
(a) Rolling Moment Coefficient 
Figure E-6.  DC-8 Vortex-induced Aerodynamic Characteristics on Falcon 20 in Near Field, 1% 
Vortex Core Radius 
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(b) Induced Normal Force Coefficient 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(c) Pitching Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(d) Side Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(e) Yawing Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(f) Vertical Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(g) Vertical Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(h) Right Horizontal Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(i) Right Horizontal Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(j) Left Horizontal Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Continued 
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(k) Left Horizontal Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-6.  Concluded 
The Falcon 20 induced aerodynamic characteristics for the DC-8 vortex core radius equal to 2 
percent of the DC-8 wing span are shown below (Figures E-7(a) through E-7(b)).  Note that the 
only impact on the Falcon 20 aerodynamics is near the vortex core.  When the Falcon 20 is away 
from the core, the vortex induced results are the same as for the smaller core radius. 
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(a)  Rolling Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  DC-8 Vortex-induced Aerodynamic Characteristics on Falcon 20 in Near Field, 2% 
Vortex Core Radius 
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(b)  Induced Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(c)  Pitching Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(d)  Side Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(e) Yawing Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(f) Vertical Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(g) Vertical Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(h) Right Horizontal Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(i) Right Horizontal Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(j) Left Horizontal Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Continued 
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(k) Left Horizontal Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-7.  Concluded 
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(a) Rolling Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  DC-8 Vortex-induced Aerodynamic Characteristics on Falcon 20 in Near Field,  
3.5% Vortex Core Radius 
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(b) Induced Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(c) Pitching Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(d) Side Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(e) Yawing Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(f) Vertical Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(g) Vertical Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(h) Right Horizontal Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(i) Right Horizontal Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
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(j) Left Horizontal Tail Normal Force Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Continued 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00822 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation  
for the ACCESS Research Team 
Page #: 
 
185 of 371 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00822 
 
 
(k) Left Horizontal Tail Root Bending Moment Coefficient 
 
Figure E-8.  Concluded 
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Appendix F. STRLNCH Simulations Component Loads Results 
 
Six dynamic simulations of the Falcon 20 released at selected locations in the DC-8 wake are 
described in Section 7.2.4.  For each simulation, the Falcon 20 in a light- or heavyweight 
configuration is trimmed for free-stream flight conditions and released, stick fixed, from three 
different locations as defined in Table 7.2-8.   The details of the component loads and bending 
moments are available at all times throughout the simulation, and these results are presented 
below in graphical form.  Note that the tables of values for the Falcon 20 aerodynamic 
characteristics in each simulation are available in digital format.  The animation of each 
simulation is also available. 
As described in Table 7.2-8, Simulation 1 is for the Falcon 20 released at the location of 
maximum induced rolling moment, Simulation 2 is for the Falcon 20 aligned with the centerline 
of the inboard DC-8 engine, and Simulation 3 is for the Falcon 20 left wing tip in the center of 
the primary DC-8 trailing vortex.  Each simulation will be further designated as for the light- or 
heavyweight Falcon 20.  For completeness, some of the simulation results presented in Section 
7.2.4 will be repeated in this appendix to keep all results for a simulation in one place. 
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The lightweight Falcon 20 is released at t = 0 from the location of maximum induced rolling 
moment, and snapshots of the motion at 0.5-second intervals are shown in Figure F-1 for 
Simulation 1L. 
 
 
 
Figure F-1.  Lightweight Falcon 20, Simulation 1L 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00822 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation  
for the ACCESS Research Team 
Page #: 
 
188 of 371 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00822 
 
 
Figure F-2.  Light Falcon 20 Flight Characteristics, Simulation 1L 
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Figure F-3.  Light Falcon 20 Aerodynamic Characteristics, Simulation 1L 
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Figure F-4.  Light Falcon 20 Wing Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, Simulation 1L 
 
 
 
Figure F-5.  Light Falcon 20 Tail Components Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, 
Simulation 1L 
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The heavyweight Falcon 20 is released at t = 0 from the location of maximum induced rolling 
moment, and snapshots of the motion at 0.5-second intervals are shown in Figure F-6 for 
Simulation 1. 
 
 
 
Figure F-6.  Heavyweight Falcon 20, Simulation 1H 
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Figure F-7.  Heavy Falcon 20 Flight Characteristics, Simulation 1H 
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Figure F-8.  Heavy Falcon 20 Aerodynamic Characteristics, Simulation 1H 
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Figure F-9.  Heavy Falcon 20 Wing Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, Simulation 1H 
 
 
 
Figure F-10.  Heavy Falcon 20 Tail Components Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, 
Simulation 1H 
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The lightweight Falcon 20 is released at t = 0 from the location in line with the inboard engine 
centerline, and snapshots of the motion at 0.5-second intervals are shown in Figure F-11 for 
Simulation 2L. 
 
 
Figure F-11.  Lightweight Falcon 20, Simulation 2L 
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Figure F-12.  Light Falcon 20 Flight Characteristics, Simulation 2L 
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Figure F-13.  Light Falcon 20 Aerodynamic Characteristics, Simulation 2L 
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Figure F-14.  Light Falcon 20 Wing Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, Simulation 2L 
 
 
 
Figure F-15.  Light Falcon 20 Tail Components Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, 
Simulation 2L 
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The heavyweight Falcon 20 is released at t = 0 from the location in line with the inboard engine 
centerline, and snapshots of the motion at 0.5-second intervals are shown in Figure F-16 for 
Simulation 2H. 
 
 
 
Figure F-16.  Heavyweight Falcon 20, Simulation 2H 
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Figure F-17.  Heavy Falcon 20 Flight Characteristics, Simulation 2H 
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Figure F-18.  Heavy Falcon 20 Aerodynamic Characteristics, Simulation 2H 
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Figure F-19.  Heavy Falcon 20 Wing Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, Simulation 2H 
 
 
 
Figure F-20.  Heavy Falcon 20 Tail Components Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, 
Simulation 2H 
 
  
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00822 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation  
for the ACCESS Research Team 
Page #: 
 
203 of 371 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00822 
The lightweight Falcon 20 is released at t = 0 from the location aft of the DC-8 with the left 
wingtip in the center of the primary trailing vortex, and snapshots of the motion at 0.5-second 
intervals are shown in Figure F-21 for Simulation 3L. 
 
 
 
Figure F-21.  Lightweight Falcon 20, Simulation 3L 
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Figure F-22.  Light Falcon 20 Flight Characteristics, Simulation 3L 
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Figure F-23.  Light Falcon 20 Aerodynamic Characteristics, Simulation 3L 
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Figure F-24.  Light Falcon 20 Wing Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, Simulation 3L 
 
 
 
Figure F-25.  Light Falcon 20 Tail Components Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, 
Simulation 3L 
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The heavyweight Falcon 20 is released at t = 0 from the location aft of the DC-8 with the left 
wing tip in the center of the primary trailing vortex, and snapshots of the motion at 0.5-second 
intervals are shown in Figure F-26 for Simulation 3. 
 
 
 
Figure F-26.  Heavyweight Falcon 20, Simulation 3H 
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Figure F-27.  Heavy Falcon 20 Flight Characteristics, Simulation 3H 
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Figure F-28.  Heavy Falcon 20 Aerodynamic Characteristics, Simulation 3H 
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Figure F-29.  Heavy Falcon 20 Wing Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, Simulation 3H 
 
 
 
Figure F-30.  Heavy Falcon 20 Tail Components Normal Force and Bending Moment Coefficients, 
Simulation 3H 
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Appendix G. DLR Teleconference Q&A 
 
ACCESS project team questions for DLR telecom 
 
DLR pilots Roland Welser and Stephan Grillenbeck answered questions posed by the ACCESS project team and 
the NESC on 18 Sep 2012 in a one hour telecom.  Their answers (as transcribed by project pilot Greg Slover) are 
in blue lettering following the NASA questions. 
 
1.        Was the DLR FA-20 instrumented at all for monitoring structural loads anticipated from wake vortex 
encounters?  No, the DLR FA-20 is not instrumented for structural loads. 
 
2.       What distance did you allow contrail sampling behind the leading aircraft? Sampling is broken into two 
separate regimes; near and far.  Near is in the 1-5 wingspans aft of the lead aircraft, far is a point around 2 miles 
aft and further. 
a.        What rationale did you use for picking that distance? Near field distances avoided the lead 
aircraft wake vortex as the exhaust and vortex have not yet mixed.  Pilots can visually identify the point where 
the vortex begins to mix and exit the exhaust at that point.  They avoid the wake vortex visually, slide aft of the 
lead aircraft until the exhaust separates vertically from the wake vortex eventually having 300-400 feet vertical 
separation.  They can then sample this separated exhaust up to 20 nm aft as long as contrails are still visible. 
 
3.       Were there any wake encounters during your sampling missions? Yes. 
a.       If so, what were the conditions that led up to it, how violent were they and did they exceed any 
monitored loads? The conditions that led up to any inadvertent vortex penetration was loss of visual contrail 
references at very far distances (10-20 nm). 
b.      What was max roll/yaw rate, G-load, bank or pitch excursion? Max roll rates estimated at 60 
deg/sec, G-load was not an issue on these encounters, bank excursions were up to 90 deg and pitch excursions 
were +/- 5 degrees.  An encounter spit the aircraft out of the wake very quickly so there was no dwell time in 
the vortex if inadvertently encountered. 
 
4.       What recovery procedures, if any, were developed for the risk of upsets? No special recovery procedures 
were developed, recovery was intuitive for the pilots. 
 
5.       Were any inspections done on the aircraft after a wake encounter? No special inspections were done as 
the pilots never felt any load limits were approached or exceeded.  However, since DLR has been doing this for 
20-30 years, the aircraft has undergone many major aircraft C and D-check inspections where any structural 
issues would have been found. 
a.       If so, did the inspections find any issues? No issues found during the normal major aircraft 
inspections. 
 
6.       What techniques did the pilots use to visualize where to position the aircraft for proper sampling? The 
contrails provided enough visual references to position the sampling aircraft. 
 
7.       What techniques did the pilots use to visualize what positions to avoid? They stopped near field sampling 
when vortex roll-up would become visible in the exhaust contrail.  They started far field sampling when the 
exhaust contrail and vortex contrail began to separate again and had positive vertical safe separation. 
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8.       Were any special cockpit displays developed to help the pilot position the aircraft correctly (or used to 
avoid hazardous positions). No. 
 
9.       Can NASA obtain and review DLR’s safety plan and hazard analysis? DLR did not develop a safety plan or 
hazard analysis for these experiments.  Lessons learned have been handed down from pilot to pilot over 30 
years (note only a handful of pilots have participated so there has been good continuity). 
 
10.   Did DLR experience engine flameouts? Yes. 
a.       If so, did any fail to relight? No, it relit without problem. 
b.      If so, was there any damage? No. 
c.       How many vs. the number of sampling missions? They have only had one flameout (single) in their 
20-30 years of flying these experiments. 
 
11.   Was dual engine flameout a consideration and how did DLR plan their flights to deal with this risk? Yes it is 
a consideration, though in Europe they have suitable airfields w/in gliding distance all over and rarely did it 
effect where they could conduct the experiments. 
 
12.   Was structural failure a consideration and how did DLR plan their flights to deal with this risk? Structural 
failure is a consideration.  They plan their flights to avoid the vortex using the techniques listed in 2(a) and 7 
above.  They also only use their Falcon 20 for these experiments due to its reputation for robust design strength.  
They have a G-550 and would not do these experiments on the G-550 due to its T-tail design.  They noted the 
FA-20 has exceeded Mach-1 in past (NASA pilots heard this anecdotally during type training at SIMCOM from a 
long time Falcon pilot). 
 
13.   Were any special cockpit procedures or checklists developed for these flights? No. 
 
14.   Were any aircraft systems considered go/no-go for safety of test reasons? Nothing specifically developed, 
though they did note that they only go into these experiments with all systems operational.  They do ensure 
VMC is present in the sampling airspace and strive for 10,000 feet of VMC below. 
 
 
NESC FTHM assessment team questions for DLR telecom 
 
GENERAL (due to the similarity of questions between the ACCESS project team and NESC, some questions were 
skipped during the telecom to avoid duplication and keep the telecom to a reasonable time period, the skipped 
questions were at the discretion of Greg Slover who was asking the questions.  NESC had difficulty dialing in to 
the international phone number and was only listening through a cell phone placed near the LaRC speaker 
phone.  NESC questions may not have been fully answered since they could not directly ask them and clarify with 
follow-up questions.) 
 
1. What lead airplanes have been used in the DLR experiments?  From the photos NASA received, it 
appears there were one or more Airbus two-engine ICAO medium class airplanes and the DLR ATTAS 
VFW-614 aircraft.  Has there been any four-engine ICAO heavy class (>136 metric tons) aircraft used as 
lead aircraft?  If so, what aircraft was or were used? The 4-engine heavy class aircraft DLR has sampled 
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include A-340, DC-8, B-747 and B-707 aircraft. (Later e-mail confirmed an A-380 sampling mission not 
know to Roland at the time). 
 
2. For each lead airplane you followed - 
x At what trail distances behind each airplane? 1-5 wingspans aft for near field and 1 or 2 miles aft to 
20 miles for far field sampling. 
x Cite handling problems behind each airplane? The turbulence in the exhaust was described as a 
“washboard effect.”  Maintaining position in the washboard effect gave positive feedback they 
were in the right sampling position.  Decreased visibility in the exhaust was a greater effect for the 
pilot to compensate for. 
x Cite worst involuntary upset experienced behind each airplane? Max roll rates estimated at 60 
deg/sec, G-load was not an issue on these encounters, bank excursions were up to 90 deg and pitch 
excursions were +/- 5 degrees.  An encounter spit the aircraft out of the wake very quickly so there 
was no dwell time in the vortex if inadvertently encountered. 
x If upset occurred, extraordinary piloting skills required to recover for any particular aircraft? No 
extraordinary piloting skill required. 
 
3. What was your Falcon model number and age? FA-20E serial number 329 delivered in 1975 (compared 
to NASA’s FA-20G serial number 447 delivered in early 80s). 
 
4. At what altitudes were the jet exhaust samples taken for these flight tests? FL270 – FL350. 
 
5. Please describe your weather minima for go/no go operations (visibility, cloud clearance, turbulence, 
icing, etc). Smooth air, VMC at sampling altitude and 10,000 feet below, discernible horizon. 
6. What was the closest distance the Falcon got in trail to the lead aircraft? 100 meters. How was this 
distance determined? Visual references. 
 
7. What is the greatest distance the Falcon was behind the lead aircraft to capture exhaust gases from 
that lead aircraft? 15-20 miles when a good contrail existed for visual reference. 
 
 
 
APPROACH & HOLD 
 
8. Please describe your approach to the lead aircraft in terms of 
x Lead aircraft altitude and airspeed 
x Your joining method, I.e. Rendezvous laterally from left or right or above/below center. Join with 
lateral separation until stable, reposition aft and high then approach contrail from above to avoid 
wing downwash effects. 
x Stabilized positions you held in terms of distance behind lead and offset left or right and stepdown 
distance.  
x Impression of wake turbulence (light or moderate per ICAO definitions) encountered in achieving 
your stabilized positions. Washboard effect. 
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x Impression of how control forces and inputs differed as dictated by jetwash, wingtip vortex, or tail 
surfaces. 
 
9. (Redundant) Please describe your piloting technique to approach the lead aircraft?  For example, did 
you approach from below the lead aircraft along its centerline?  Or how was the approach made? Did 
the approach vary with distance from the lead aircraft? For far field sampling they would only approach 
the exhaust contrail from above so as to avoid the wake vortex contrail that was 300-400 feet below 
the exhaust contrail. 
 
10. Please describe any communication procedures you used with the lead aircraft to coordinate 
maneuvers. No special communications procedures developed other than direct radio communication 
with lead aircraft. 
 
11. Please describe contingency procedures you developed (lost communication, lead aircraft emergency, 
etc). 
12. Did the Falcon have instrumentation that recorded the aircraft attitude, rates, and accelerations (to 
determine maximum excursions)? No. 
 
13. Did you have any flight deck or other instrumentation to provide advice that you had been successful in 
acquiring the required jet exhaust samples? How were you able to determine that you were successful 
acquiring the exhaust samples required by the flight test?  No.  Although pilots noted that they can 
receive verbal feedback from researcher in cabin as to when they are getting the right data. 
 
14. What was your technique to hold position once you had established the Falcon in trail of the lead 
aircraft? 
 
x If along the lead aircraft centerline, did you fly a fraction of a wing-span left and/or right? 
x At greater distance in trail of the lead aircraft, what markers did you use to determine where 
sampling was to occur? Visual acquisition of the exhaust contrail is mandatory to tell pilots where 
to position the aircraft. 
x What was your piloting technique to avoid loss of control during a possible wake encounter? 
x Were the wake turbulence effects clearly noticeable early enough during your sampling procedure 
so that you could decide when to abort a sampling and re-establish for another data sampling run? 
Yes.  Washboard effect told pilots they were correctly in the exhaust contrail and an inadvertent 
wake vortex encounter spit them out of the wake faster than a abort decision could be made. 
 
15. Did you experience any wake encounters during the DLR flight tests that you felt were nearing the 
limits of the Falcon’s ability to withstand the wake vortex induced loads?  Were there any wake 
encounters during the DLR flight test that you felt were on the safety margin? Yes there have been 
inadvertent wake encounters when far aft of the lead aircraft after contrail visual references began to 
disappear.  Pilots did not feel any limits were approached. If so, what was your concern? No concerns 
noted. 
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16. Were sampling locations easier to hold near-field or far-field from the lead plane? Neither. 
 
17. Was aero surface buffeting noticeable during sampling? Washboard effect.  
 
18. Was aero surface buffeting noticeable during recoveries? No. 
 
19. What is your characterization of ‘maneuvering difficulty’ to position the Falcon for sampling – in near 
field?  – in far field? Nothing difficult with respect to maneuvering the Falcon.  Visibility was the bigger 
effect but provided feedback that the aircraft was in the right spot. 
 
20. Was active control input from the Falcon pilot required to maintain location during sampling? Yes.  How 
much?  
 
21. At any time on any flight, was there ever a subjective notion that the Falcon was being stressed to near 
any kind of structural limit? No.  Was there ever a time in the sampling program when the Falcon pilot 
thought, "you know, maybe we shouldn't be doing this"? No.  This question is the spot where Roland 
mentioned they would only do this with the Falcon and would avoid doing this with their G-550. 
 
22. Based on your flight test experience does it seem practicable to plan to hold position up to 30 seconds 
directly inside a wake vortex? They avoided the wake vortex altogether, so holding position in the vortex 
isn’t required. 
 
UPSETS & EXIT 
23. What were the maximum aircraft excursions encountered during these tests? Was the maximum in 
attitude (roll, pitch, yaw), in angular rates, or in accelerations?  Or was it some combination?  At what 
distance in trail of the lead were those maximums observed? See #2 above.  The distances where 
inadvertent wake encounters occurred was stated at the 15-20 mile range when the contrail was no 
longer clearly visible. 
 
24. Please describe how you departed the formation/near field flight from the lead (lateral, descent, etc). 
 
25. (Redundant) What were the best techniques to exit the wake to minimize the load on the aircraft? 
Climb up then slide laterally upwind. 
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Appendix H. Preliminary Stakeholder Outbrief 
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Appendix I. ACCESS Pre-Experiment Technical Briefing  
(To DFRC Independent Review Team) February 8, 2013 
 
The ACCESS team presented to a Dryden IRT. The NESC team participated to stay abreast of 
ACCESS test plans prior to beginning their experimental flight tests.   
 
NESC pre-meeting “input” for each IRT question can be seen in the following spreadsheet.  The 
ACCESS team’s briefing charts are also included. 
 
All questions were answered satisfactorily.     
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ACCESS Tech Briefing      
31-Jan-13       
RFA ID IR Team Request ACCESS Team Response NESC Team Input 
 
FRR-001 During near field testing 
a KIO is called when the 
coherent wake rolls up 
with the outer contrail, 
but that occurs aft of the 
HU-25.  How visible is 
that location from the 
cockpit? Have any 
additional considerations 
for chase or exterior 
cameras been explored? 
Video from the T-39 
SUCCESS program showed 
that exhaust contrail and 
wingtip vortex rollup is 
visible in front of the aircraft 
before it is fully developed.  
ACCESS team intent is to 
KIO from pilot/copilot visual 
references before it is fully 
developed.  The team has 
video from the SUCCESS 
program which shows how 
this technique will be used.  
SUCCESS used a B-757, 
the DC-8 differs in that there 
should be some outboard 
engine exhaust evidence 
that precedes inboard 
exhaust to provide an earlier 
observation to the pilots.  
The primary observer for 
reaching KIO visual criteria 
will be the PNF. 
Unknown, have to be in 
cockpit to gauge field of view. 
 
FRR-002 A KIO is called for if 
>50% sustained control 
input in the HU-25 in the 
wake.  How is this 
monitored, and who is 
responsible for making 
the KIO call? 
It is qualitatively monitored 
by the two pilots.  Pilot flying 
would be the primary person 
responsible for recognizing 
over 50% sustained inputs.  
The PNF can also call KIO if 
he thinks inputs have 
reached that point.  The 
aircraft has no control 
position sensors to allow 
any other crew member to 
know if this point has been 
reached. 
Pilot Flying has best idea of 
% of control input; Pilot 
monitoring can back up if 
"following along" or "riding" 
controls. Consider IP 
defensive positioning by PM 
to block rapid, extreme 
movements.  
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FRR-003 Where is the specific 
required action during a 
KIO documented?  In the 
near field is it a descent 
or is it based on visual 
cues based on the 
location of the contrails 
and the wake? 
KIO exit maneuver will be 
situation dependent based 
on aircraft position to the 
vortex, visibility of the DC-8 
and contrails, and existing 
control inputs when the KIO 
call is made.  The expected 
action for near field will be to 
move down and towards 
centerline and for far field it 
will be to move up and then 
laterally outboard either 
side.  A specific required 
action cannot cover every 
situation so it has not been 
written down but is 
understood to be based on 
pilot flying's judgment at the 
time, more than likely fitting 
into the descriptions above.  
Inadvertent wingtip vortex 
penetration and out of 
control recovery procedures 
are documented in the 
mission rules. 
That's up to the project's 
mission rules. There could be 
an ascending level of 
responses based on what the 
crew evaluates they've 
experienced. Down and out 
in near field or up and out in 
far field seem to be the 
German practices. Post-KIO 
evaluation of possible 
damage or crew injury should 
be included to decide 
whether to resume research 
or abort.  
FRR-004 What are the Handling 
qualities of the HU-25?  
Does it permit precise 
formation control without 
undo pilot work load?  Is 
it used in a precision 
tracking mission in an 
operational environment? 
The HU-25 operational 
mission has required 
formation flying with aircraft 
that range from USCG 
helicopters during SAR to 
airliners during air intercept 
missions.  NASA LARC 
pilots have talked to USCG 
pilots regarding formation 
flying, but that conversation 
with operational pilots will 
never yield an answer to a 
Cooper-Harper like 
evaluation.  Pitch sensitivity 
is mentioned in the flight 
manual, so LARC pilots 
have discussed techniques 
and will remain aware of 
PIO or high workload 
possibilities. There will be a 
TPS grad at all times in the 
cockpit who is 
knowledgeable in C-H 
evaluation and will remain 
DAR and LaRC have the 
knowledge. LaRC answer is 
good.  
 
Since the primary concern is 
relative position to the wake, 
DC-8 position is secondary. 
Airspeed will be a factor in 
control sensitivity, there will 
be a best speed for control 
that will likely differ from the 
required speed for collection. 
As long as the PF can focus 
on outside scan primarily, the 
PM should handle everything 
else--navigation, comms, 
checklists. Each should 
advise the other if they feel 
they are getting behind the 
situation. 
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cognizant of excessive 
workload when 
accomplishing the tasks. 
FRR-005 Is chase required or 
desired for helping with 
visual references? 
Chase aircraft has never 
been either discussed or 
desired.  A chase aircraft 
adds complexity and 
coordination for limited 
expected gain. 
Concur with LaRC. Risk 
outweighs benefit. 
 
FRR-006 How is aircraft relative 
position measured and 
monitored between the 
DC-8 and the HU-25? 
Pilot visual references.  Post 
flight analysis will provide 
precise positioning 
information for research 
purposes, but in-flight test 
conduct will be solely by 
visual reference to the 
aircraft and/or contrails. 
Concur with LaRC. There is a 
brief learning curve for each 
new formation encounter, 
between different aircraft and 
pilot handling characteristics. 
Normally the wingman can 
quickly adjust without need 
for communication, as long 
as the lead is predictable and 
communicates 
airspeed/altitude/heading 
changes. In this case, contrail 
characteristics will change 
with density altitude and 
humidity, so there will be a 
brief learning curve there as 
well. 
 
FRR-007 Where are the limits for 
what constitutes an RTB 
documented?  If you get 
a flame out is that an 
RTB, what about if you 
accidently fly through the 
wake is it an RTB if you 
exceed 2.5g’s or 65 
degrees of bank and how 
would you know if you 
exceeded those limits? 
We will be establishing 
exceedence criteria for 
maneuver KIO as well as 
exceedence criteria for RTB.  
This will be presented in the 
team brief to the IRT and 
documented in the test 
cards. 
See my input to FRR-003 
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FRR-008 Has the communication 
protocol been 
documented?  Are you 
going to say “Knock it 
off”, or “Abort”, are there 
multiple radio calls and 
what do all of them mean 
and what is the required 
action for each aircraft 
when the calls are 
made? 
Protocols for formation and 
aircraft internal 
communications will be 
documented in the flight 
cards and briefed as part of 
the flight crew and formation 
briefing.  The comm plan will 
be presented to the IRT 
during the team 
presentation. 
Project owns this. It matters 
most that everyone involve 
AGREE to and USE the 
protocol, rather than the 
exact nature of the protocol. 
 
FRR-009 Have you considered Hot 
Mic for the HU-25 to 
increase situational 
awareness to the DC-8 
crew? 
Hot mic between aircraft has 
not been considered.  It is 
technically not feasible with 
the HU-25 current 
configuration.  If DC-8 
desires specific calls for SA, 
PNF can accomplish over 
radio. 
LaRC answer is good. Hot 
Mic is voice-actuated rather 
than finger-actuated. Unless 
the pilot is familiar with the 
fraction-of-a-second delay in 
voice actuation (think of using 
your cell phone in speaker 
mode), the first word in a call 
may be lost using Hot Mic. In 
this situation, clarity is 
preferable over speed. 
 
FRR-010 For laser operations is 
there a ground test 
hazard, and what are 
your mitigations?  How 
powerful is the laser? 
The DLH laser beam is not 
eyesafe within 2 meters of 
the window port. Ground 
hazard mitigation is denial of 
access to that area except 
by trained personnel 
wearing approved laser 
safety eyewear. The laser 
output power is nominally 
~25 mW, but in practice we 
emit less than 20 mW 
through the window. Beam 
divergence renders the 
beam eyesafe by 2 meters.  
References are the Langley 
laser safety permit and the 
HU-25 specific hazard 
package.  Dryden Laser 
Safety personnel have been 
provided the DLH laser 
specifics.  Upon their review 
if they determine we need a 
separate permit for 
Dryden/DAOF one will be 
issued.  The DLH laser is 
not required and will not be 
active during ground testing. 
LaRC answer is good. 
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FRR-011 How much clearance 
between the 
measurement locations 
and the wake vortices is 
there?  Just looking for 
rough magnitudes. Is it 
one HU-25 wing span is 
it 10 ft?  How precise 
does the HU-25 have to 
be to stay out of the 
“dangerous” locations? 
HU-25 wingspan = 54', DC-8 
wingspan = 148'.  Inboard 
engine is 26' off centerline 
and outboard engine is 45' 
off centerline.  The HU-25 
sampling the inboard engine 
would have some of the 
outboard wingtip in the 
outboard engine exhaust.  
The HU-25 outboard wingtip 
would be 47' from the DC-8 
outboard wingtip. A receiver 
with precise visual 
references is able to 
maintain +/- 10' laterally 
while in contact.  I'd expect 
our references won't be as 
good, and thus not as 
precise, but in close we 
would have to move 50' 
(about one HU-25 
wingspan) laterally to get the 
vertical fin directly behind 
the wingtip.   
I defer to LaRC. The contrail 
will put them in a slightly 
different position than the 
engine, and the wingtip 
vortex of course has some 
diameter based on distance 
from the aircraft. The 
clearance will be less than 
50', but well within the ability 
to position the aircraft 
nonetheless. I estimate an 
experienced formation pilot 
will be able to maintain 
position in clear air within a 5 
foot radius of the desired 
point in clear air, in close to 
the DC-8. In the exhaust, this 
will degrade due to buffeting, 
and I don't know how much. 
Looked like the DAR pilots 
concentrated more on 
following the exhaust pattern 
rather than staying in one 
spot. 
 
FRR-012 In the far field sampling if 
you can see the 
separated exhaust plume 
but not the vortices would 
you still sample the 
plume?  
It is a pre-requisite to 
observe separation between 
the wingtip vortex and the 
exhaust plume prior to 
sampling, therefore we 
would not begin far field 
exhaust sampling if we 
couldn't see the vortices 
below.  Sampling in the 
exhaust does limit visibility, 
but knowledge of altitude 
separation has already been 
achieved.  Visibility returns 
gradually when exiting the 
exhaust plume with enough 
visible warning to remain 
clear of the wingtip vortices.  
See DLR far field videos. 
Good LaRC answer. They've 
adopted the DAR criteria 
which I believe is sound. 
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FRR-013 For dual engine failure 
(HR 2), how does a dual 
engine failure affect the 
other aircraft systems?  
Cabin pressurization, 
hydraulic feel system, 
electrical systems?  
Would it be critical to 
preserve battery backup 
to power down all the 
instrumentation system 
components or are they 
isolated from the battery 
backup by design? Any 
other considerations? 
Note: APU cannot be run at 
these high altitudes, 
consideration is given to 
operating on battery power 
only until APU or engine 
relight.  Cabin pressure will 
begin to increase as there 
will be no more inflow, 
outflow valves will close 
when cabin pressure can't 
be maintained.  The leak 
rate will be investigated 
during our CFP flights.  
Hydraulic flight controls will 
revert to battery powered 
STBY pump, the feel is 
slightly sluggish but very 
controllable, without the 
STBY pump manual 
reversion is possible with 
greatly increased control 
forces.  Electrical power will 
be from two batteries with a 
recent battery capacity 
check.  There is an auto 
load shed function.  
Additional systems can be 
shed as well to reduce 
battery drain until an APU or 
engine is relit.  Windmilling 
RPM was found in 
simulation to be over 300 
KIAS so it is expected to 
need battery power for 
starter assist if at best glide 
speed.  Instrumentation 
power is run through the 
load shed function and 
project acknowledges loss 
of research system power 
with loss of one or both 
engines.  Battery power 
preservation is imperative as 
the APU and engines cannot 
be immediately started due 
to altitude restart limitations; 
auto load-shed, manual load 
shed and research power 
shutoff will be used to 
I cannot overemphasize the 
benefit of practicing a total 
engine failure/loss of 
hydraulics/electric power in 
the simulator.  
 
I have direct knowledge of a 
P-3 crew that saved itself in 
this highly unique situation in 
March 1995. The copilot was 
an experienced instructor I 
had flown with in the P-3 
training squadron, who had 
practiced this in the sim and 
prompted all the right actions 
in time (they regained control 
at 2,500 feet, otherwise 
would have had about 30 
seconds to ground impact).  
 
Knowledge of what to do is 
good, but practicing the skills 
of doing it makes all the 
difference in time and 
preventing the situation from 
becoming uncontrollable.  
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preserve battery power for 
APU/engine relight or 
flameout landing.  The 
standby horizon Jetpack 
battery also powers the 
VHF1 radio usable through 
the handheld microphone. 
Battery capacity checks of 
the stby horizon and both 
aircraft batteries was 
accomplished week of 4 Feb 
2013. 
FRR-014 What is your altitude 
tolerance for getting the 
data you want?  If you 
have conditions for 
contrails at a different 
altitude can you test 
there instead for that 
day? 
Our only requirement is to 
sample at altitudes where 
contrails form.  We will be 
reviewing meteorological 
data and model predictions 
prior to flight to determine 
whether contrail-forming 
conditions exist over the 
Edwards AFB complex and 
if so, what the most likely 
altitudes are.   When we 
arrive on site, we will have 
one or both aircraft spiral 
from 30 to 39 kft to 
determine the altitude range 
where the heaviest contrails 
form.   Once established, 
we'll conduct a series of 
flight legs at those altitudes.  
If we find that contrails do 
not form anywhere within 
our experiment box, we will 
terminate the mission. 
I'm glad they are not tying 
themselves to R-2508 
airspace. This tendency for 
contrails to form or not should 
be identified as early as 
possible (like starting this 
month) to plan for the best 
location. On the day of the 
mission, there should be no 
doubt where the best 
conditions exist, just 
verification.  
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FRR-015 What are the rules for 
crew movement in the 
HU-25 during near and 
far field sampling?  Can 
the instrumentation 
operator reach all of the 
racks/systems without 
getting out of their seat?  
Maybe it’s considered 
standard aircraft 
operations, but I would 
have expected to see a 
mission rule or 
discussion in one of the 
hazards about it.  Any 
PPE they should be 
wearing or gear they 
should carry? 
Research crew will be 
securely belted into their 
seats with 4-point harnesses 
during all exhaust and 
contrail sampling. 
Instrument controls are 
arranged so that operators 
can control and make all 
necessary 
adjustments/calibrations 
while seated.  Aircraft would 
need to stop sampling for 
any out-of-seat 
requirements. Researchers 
are required to wear flight 
suits by LARC policy.  100% 
oxygen is available at each 
seat position in addition to 
the passenger drop down 
masks. There are other 
specifications called out in 
the LaRC specific Hazard 
Package. 
I don't know the internal 
arrangement of the HU-25 as 
modified, but if there are 
sharp-edged racks around, 
Nomex MILSPEC flight 
gloves provide a good ability 
to grip things without injury. 
Whenever researchers 
unstrap they should keep 
"one hand for yourself and 
one for the ship" as they 
move about. 
 
Each Center does what it 
approves, but I've found it's a 
good practice to simulate Fire 
of Unknown Origin in the 
cabin so the crew is familiar 
with that aircraft's procedure 
and knows how to assist 
when necessary, knows 
when to stay seated and 
quiet. 
 
FRR-016 How was the HU-25’s air 
data calibrated post mod, 
and how accurate do you 
expect it to be in the 
wake?  Was this 
considered when 
discussing how the 
formation tolerances are 
maintained? 
All modifications are outside 
the RVSM critical areas.  
We expect fluctuations in 
airspeed and altitude while 
in the exhaust.  Once 
sampling, altitude is 
maintained visually and 
airspeed is no longer critical 
as we need to move aft to 
provide samples at multiple 
distances.  There is no 
tolerance to maintaining a 
specific altitude or airspeed. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-017 What g and vibration 
specifications were the 
racks and 
instrumentation systems 
on the HU-25 tested to?  
Are we confident that 
they are not likely to 
come loose during an 
upset, or have parts 
vibrate off while being 
buffeted in the DC-8’s 
wake?  I assume they 
are designed to the crash 
The racks were designed to 
meet or exceed the crash 
load certification of the HU-
25.  FAR 25 crash load 
certification is 9 G forward, 2 
G up, 4.5 G down and 1.5 G 
sideways. The rack weight 
and CG locations to meet 
the above crash loads were 
complied with.  Additionally, 
installation of all 
components are inspected 
by Flight QA for compliance 
LaRC answer is good. 
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loads limits for the HU-25 
which would be well 
above the limits for a 
wake encounter.  What 
about other loose 
equipment that could fly 
around during an upset? 
with processes, procedures 
and best practices.  Crew 
will stow all loose items prior 
to start of sampling.  All 
research additions will be 
inspected after each CFP 
flight. 
FRR-018 Is intercom on the HU-25 
a mission critical 
requirement? If the 
intercom on the aircraft 
fails for whatever reason 
is that an RTB? It 
happens and I just 
wanted to make sure the 
team has discussed it. 
IAW mission rule go/no-go 
list, intercom is a 
requirement between all 
crew/QNC. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-019 Va = 220 KCAS for the 
HU-25 but there is a 
desire to get data at 
>mach = 0.7.  That is 
pretty constraining from 
an altitude perspective.  
How is the decision 
made to go above Va for 
a test?  Is there a buildup 
approach (didn’t see any 
test point sequencing in 
the test plan). 
It is not too constraining at 
the sampling altitudes of 
FL310-390.  Va is 220 KIAS 
and T-storm penetration 
speed is 250 KIAS/.75M.  If 
we can't maintain below Va, 
then flying up to gust 
penetration speed is 
allowable with reduced 
control inputs.  For 
reference: FL310 .7M = 257 
KIAS and we'll sample 
slightly slower than .7M and 
remain below gust 
penetration speed but at 
FL390 .7M is 214 KIAS and 
we can sample at .7M and 
also be below Va.  There is 
no buildup approach 
mentioned because of such 
a small overlap of speeds 
between the DC-8 and HU-
25.  Build up in one area 
often conflicted with safety 
aspects of another (i.e. max 
altitude best for engine out 
glide but worst for FQ).  The 
build up approach we are 
using is to have a practice 
sortie before a data sortie. 
LaRC answer is good. The 
faster you fly, the smoother 
and gentler you need to be 
with control inputs. They 
know this, but one actually 
has to get bounced around at 
high speed to internalize it. 
Most pilots upon first 
encountering moderate buffet 
in formation react by 'holding 
what they've got' at first, 
which is good for the 
airplane. Going through a 
buildup will get their muscle 
and long-term memory in 
good shape for this.  
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FRR-020 I would recommend a 
mini-tech after the pre-
experiment build up 
flights to access the 
workload of the vortex 
avoidance procedures, 
and show pictures/video 
of the regions you intend 
to test in. 
Pictures and videos exist 
from T-39 SUCCESS and 
DLR FA-20 sampling 
activity.  Our procedures are 
built upon these techniques 
and lessons learned.  Test 
team has a responsibility to 
terminate testing based on 
any safety issue which will 
include a lack of correlation 
to expected visual cues. Any 
safety termination would 
generate a new briefing to 
the board. This includes 
safety issues discovered 
during the pre experiment 
sortie. 
LaRC answer is good. I 
would recommend a 
structured crew and test team 
debrief after every flight to 
compare inflight findings and 
impressions of controllability, 
new environmental 
knowledge…does the test 
plan or procedures need any 
changes? I'm sure they're 
already planning to do this. 
 
FRR-021 In the far field how is it 
determined that the 
vortices are ~300 ft 
below the sampling 
aircraft? 
By flying abeam the contrail, 
we intend to vary HU-25 
altitude so as to provide an 
assessment of the altitude 
difference between the 
exhaust trail and the 
remaining vortices.  By 
looking aft when laterally 
positioned, HU-25 crew can 
determine that the 
separation continues to 
increase with aft distance. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-022 Are the altitudes 
specified in the test plan 
for the lead aircraft or the 
trail aircraft?  Will the 
lead aircraft be asked to 
maneuver to allow the 
sampling aircraft to 
sample at particular 
altitudes? 
The specified altitudes are 
for the lead aircraft.   The 
contrail system can either 
descend or ascend, 
depending on 
meteorological conditions, 
so the Falcon will have to 
adjust its altitude to sample 
exhaust emissions while 
avoiding the trailing vortices.  
The lead aircraft will only be 
asked to change altitudes 
once a successful run for 
both JP-8 and Blended fuels 
is accomplished.  During 
any run, the DC-8 will 
remain fixed at the same 
altitude. 
LaRC answer is good. As I 
recall they'll elevate to save 
fuel if they can remain in 
contrail conditions or get to 
better conditions. 
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FRR-023 Any WATR support 
requirements?  Radar, 
video … 
No. I understand this to be 
Western Aeronautical Test 
Range, which has extensive 
tracking capability. 
 
FRR-024 What format is the data 
from the DC-8 given to 
the LARC team? 
Post mission data from the 
DC-8 should be in the 
standard "REVEAL", 1-
second averaged format.   
Needed parameters include: 
Static Air Temp, Static Air 
Press, Mach #, True Air 
Speed, Palt, GPS_alt, 
horizontal winds, GPS Lat 
and Lon, pitch, roll, true 
heading, platform heading, 
etc. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-025 How does our pod design 
differ from the DLR 
design, and the AFFTC 
pod design?  It sounds 
like AFFTC departed 
their vehicle in part due 
to a pod design. 
The departure from 
controlled flight during 
AFFTC's testing (full rudder 
SHSS) was attributed to the 
Side Looking Airborne 
Radar (SLAR).  This SLAR 
pod was very large and 
attached well forward of the 
CG on the right fuselage 
below CL and stretched 
from the wing leading edge 
to the copilot's window.  Our 
configuration has no SLAR 
pod and the wing pylons and 
stores will be different.  The 
USCG stores are much 
larger, heavier and had 
more drag that the CAPS 
probe being installed in the 
NASA HU-25.  The DLR 
Falcon can carry up to 5 
pylons, one centerline and 
two-each wing pylons.  The 
stores they carry are similar 
to our CAPS probe.  For 
drag reduction, we intend to 
fly with one pylon only as 
FQ reports for varying pylon 
configs (one vs. two) did not 
result in any negative FQ 
LaRC answer is good. I don't 
have their buildup plan, but I 
expect they'll evaluate how 
the HU-25 handles differently 
in critical situations (engine 
loss after takeoff, just prior to 
landing). 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Assessment Report 
Document #: 
NESC-RP-
12-00822 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation  
for the ACCESS Research Team 
Page #: 
 
304 of 371 
 
NESC Request No.: TI-12-00822 
properties (ref AFFTC P&FQ 
test report). 
FRR-026 Do the HU-25 onboard 
research instruments 
contain any hazardous 
chemicals that could 
present a risk during 
ground operations that 
ground crews should be 
aware of? I assume that 
the flight hazards have 
been addressed by the 
LARC process. 
The payload includes small 
amounts of butanol 
(contained within 
instruments), several high-
pressure calibration gas 
cylinders, and a small alpha-
particle radiation source 
sealed within a metal 
cylinder.   MSDS sheets for 
these items are available 
onboard the aircraft.   All 
chemical hazards have been 
reviewed by the ASRB, an 
industrial safety engineer 
and aircraft inspectors.  
Mitigations are in place to 
prevent harm to flight and 
ground crews.  All high 
pressure gas cylinders were  
below the max permissible 
exposures (MPE 8hr). 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-027 According to the 
discussion transcript, 
DLR had a wake 
encounter at 20 nm 
which almost departed 
the vehicle and caused a 
roll departure beyond the 
published aircraft limit.  
They also had a single 
engine failure/flame out.  
I would consider these to 
be “close calls”, were any 
procedures modified to 
minimize the probability 
of this occurring during 
The Joint Flight Test 
Planning team was 
chartered specifically to 
evaluate these risks and 
develop specific mitigations 
and procedures.  The result 
is the 11 joint hazards and 
mission rules document.  
Since DLR did not have any 
hazards analysis or written 
procedures, no DLR 
procedures were modified 
but NASA procedures were 
developed with as many 
mitigations that were 
LaRC answer is good. A 
Boeing test pilot barrel-rolled 
a 707 at low g and proved it 
to everyone. 
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the NASA test missions? deemed feasible.  Dassault 
does not publish a bank 
angle limit, so DLR did not 
go beyond a published limit, 
recovery from their event 
was natural and G-load was 
never an issue.  The bank 
angle limit can only be found 
in the USCG Dash-1. NASA 
LARC has eliminated the 
bank angle limit via our 
NASA flight manual 
supplement in order to be 
consistent with Dassault 
documentation. As long as 
the G-limit is adhered to, 
bank angle need not be 
limited.  Intentional 
aerobatics are not 
authorized.  The aircraft has 
a G-meter to monitor G-
loads during any 
unintentional encounter or 
recovery. 
FRR-028 DLR communicated that 
they feel these tests 
would be dangerous if 
they were to use their G-
550, which is a similar 
class airplane, due to its 
T-tail configuration, 
suggesting that there is 
some residual risk even 
with the procedural 
mitigations in place.  
Their testing used at 
European Falcon 20, are 
there any configuration 
differences between 
NASA’s HU-25 and 
DLR’s Falcon 20 that 
could cause any 
additional concerns, such 
as airframe hours, other 
modifications done to our 
airframe, different 
engines … 
There are configuration 
differences between their 
Falcon-20E and our Falcon-
20G but the cruciform tail is 
similar in size and shape.  
The G-model has higher 
thrust engines, higher GW 
allowable, auto-slats, dual 
environmental control units, 
a different APU, greater slat 
span, smaller mid-wing stall 
fence, an autoslat function, 
more rudder authority and a 
higher maneuver speed.  It 
is also similar to the FA-200 
series aircraft.  Our G-model 
is about 5-8 years younger.  
It has 15,500 hrs.  The one 
difference that has been 
discussed and evaluated 
during simulator recoveries 
is that the engines have 
special throttle limitations 
above 28,000' which require 
slow and deliberate action, 
LaRC answer is good. 
Should be able to leave 
power alone at first during 
most recoveries, just reduce 
it if in a dive. Lots of altitude 
to play with. 
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there is no specific 
mitigation we can determine 
that alleviates this high 
altitude engine behavior. 
FRR-029 DLR noted that there is 
decreased visibility when 
in the exhaust plume of 
the lead aircraft.  Does 
this present any 
additional risk to our 
ability to see and avoid 
the aircraft wake? 
Lower visibility in the contrail 
will affect ability to see the 
DC-8, but at that point we 
will be aft, and trending 
further aft.  The wingtip 
vortex characteristics will be 
visible in front of the HU-25 
in the contrail prior to it 
being fully entrained.  This is 
clearly visible in the videos 
with adequate cues to 
terminate sampling prior to 
reaching a state of full 
entrainment. 
I think you really don't know 
this until you try it. Sun angle, 
etc. 
 
FRR-030 What speeds are the 
near field tests planned?  
Are there any mission 
rules for KIO’s when 
relative speeds between 
the two aircraft are too 
great (drifting aft quickly 
would make seeing and 
avoiding the wake vortex 
more difficult)? 
We are targeting .7M.  The 
aft drift rate will be a natural 
result of the exhaust velocity 
with limited power available 
in the HU-25 to compensate. 
There are no mission rules 
for KIO due to relative 
airspeed. Minimum sample 
time is 10 sec, and T-39 
video shows 30-45 sec of 
sampling before reaching a 
vortex KIO criteria. 
Formation briefing will 
include breakaway 
procedures to quickly 
change a forward closure 
rate to prevent mid-air 
collisions.  Formation 
briefing will also require DC-
8 pilot to call any airspeed 
changes >5 kts. 
LaRC answer is good. 
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FRR-031 In the dash-1 (pg 204) 
the aircraft has OAT 
limitations (low temp) I 
assume that we have 
looked at those 
temperatures and 
compared them to the 
temperatures at altitude 
for EDW. 
EDW high altitude 
temperatures rarely impact 
jet flight operations.  The 
DC-8 and HU-25 have very 
compatible temperature 
limits at high altitude, 
nearing -70 deg C.  Feb 
5th's temp at FL420 was -55 
deg C.  Both aircraft have 
successfully operated in the 
arctic and and/or Antarctic 
regions at much colder 
temperatures than 
anticipated at Edwards. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-032 Is there a cooling cart 
requirement for the 
com/nav system of the 
HU-25 for ground 
testing?  Pg 750 of the 
dash-1 gives a 5 minute 
limit without cooling.  
What about for the 
experiment systems, how 
are they going to be 
cooled during ground 
ops?  Is there a concern 
for how hot the cabin of 
the HU-25 would be 
without cooling?  I know 
it’s cool outside at EDW 
in the winter, but I’m just 
wondering should we 
have a hot day, are there 
any concerns? 
There is no requirement to 
cool the Falcon during 
ground operations since 
aircraft avionics are not 
required and will be off.  The 
limitation is due to the 
enclosed aircraft avionics 
rack and not the research 
equipment.  Ground tests of 
the DC-8 will be conducted 
in early morning under cold 
conditions.   If hot conditions 
are encountered during pre-
flight, research instruments 
will not be turned on until 
after takeoff. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-033 What are the expected 
effects of the wake on 
the airdata system?  Has 
the effect on the artificial 
feel system been 
considered? 
Expected air data effects in 
the exhaust are that of gusty 
wind conditions.  The Arthur-
Q system is either in a high 
speed or low speed feel.  
The effect on the artificial 
feel system is that a gust 
could interrupt a transition 
from one setting to the other 
and be mismatched.  
Lingering at speeds near the 
transition point 
(approximately 260 and 180 
kts) during normal cruise 
can produce this mismatch.  
LaRC answer is good. 
Buildup program important to 
this. 
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It is expected most sampling 
speeds will be below the 
transition speed and if the 
Q-units are stuck in high 
speed mode, control forces 
would be higher.  There are 
procedures in the Dash-1 
that allow for continued flight 
only if the mis-match can be 
eliminated, otherwise an 
RTB fully understanding the 
remaining HQ changes is 
prudent. 
FRR-034 Does engine failure 
cause a hydraulic failure 
on 1 or more systems?  
A hydraulic failure puts 
the feel system into 
landing/low q 
configuration which 
makes the aircraft more 
sensitive to pilot 
commands.  The dash-1 
mentions PIO risk on pg 
709 in the horizontal 
stabilizer section. 
Engine failure causes the 
corresponding side hydraulic 
system to be inop.  There is 
a standby electric pump that 
can give 2,000 psi vs. the 
normal 3,000 psi to either 
side as required.  This is 
enough to operate all 
systems to recover to a 
normal landing.  The 
procedure for Q-unit failure 
is to get below 260 
KIAS/.76M, which is where 
most of our sampling 
speeds will be.  Thus, if an 
engine failure occurs, it is 
likely we are already at a 
safe airspeed and if not, we 
would not be able to 
maintain high airspeed and 
desire would be to slow to 
180 kts and drift down until 
restart is attempted. 
LaRC answer is good. My 
FRR-013 input is germane. 
 
FRR-035 Does flying in the contrail 
increase the likelihood of 
an airdata failure on the 
HU-25?  Icing/feel 
system considerations? 
Control feel considerations 
mentioned above.  Icing not 
anticipated due to the dry 
nature of any ice particle at 
those altitudes.  Pitot/Static 
heat is meant for much 
greater icing accumulation 
hazards.  Easy to exit those 
conditions if they were 
present and would recover 
fine for landing.  The 
changes in feel do not 
change aircraft stability 
LaRC answer is good. 
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characteristics but pilots are 
cognizant of PIO 
possibilities if there is a Q-
unit mismatch. 
FRR-036 In the event of a dual 
engine failure does the 
battery power the electric 
trim actuator for the 
horizontal stabilizer? 
Yes. LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-037 Autostart for the engines 
is mentioned in the dash-
1.  What is the autostart 
mode?  Is this a mode 
that can be turned on for 
testing where engine 
outs are more likely?  
747’s (SOFIA) have an 
igniter that can be turned 
on when we are doing 
reduced normal 
acceleration maneuvers 
that during normal 
aircraft operations was 
left off. 
One ignition select switch 
provides the continuous 
ignition and autostart 
modes.  Autostart mode 
simplifies pilot duties during 
a ground or flight start and is 
the normal flight position 
unless contaminated 
runways, turbulence or icing 
is present in which case 
continuous ignition is used.  
A single press of the start 
button when in autostart 
mode motors the engine 
with throttle in cutoff, 
provides ignition with throttle 
out of cutoff and disengages 
the starter and ignition upon 
idle RPM.  The mode we will 
use during sampling is  
"Ignition Select - ON" so that 
a flameout has the best 
chance of relighting on its 
own.  There is no time limit 
for continuous ignition (the 
windmilling airstart position), 
but the pilot will physically 
need to move this switch for 
a starter assisted airstart.  
"Ignition Select - Autostart" 
(middle position) would be 
used if a flameout actually 
happened and a pilot 
initiated relight was required. 
LaRC answer is good. 
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FRR-038 Pg. 642 of the dash-1 
says to “land as soon as 
practical” after a 
compressor stall even if 
the engine recovers, and 
land as soon as possible 
if it does not.  Is it an 
RTB for us if a 
flameout/compressor 
stall recovers, and would 
you land away from the 
DAOF if it did not?  Do 
we have procedures in 
place for offsite landings 
(this is probably more of 
a normal ops kind of 
thing for DC-8 and the 
HU-25 than Dryden’s 
research F-18’s and F-
15’s)? 
We would terminate 
sampling upon any 
compressor stall and RTB 
for a compressor 
stall/flameout that required 
pilot action in order to 
recover/relight.  If both 
engines are operating, we 
would land at DAOF.  If an 
engine has flamed out/been 
shut down and cannot be 
restarted, the landing field 
will be at the PIC's discretion 
based on current altitude, 
SE driftdown altitude, and 
dual engine out gliding 
distance.   An actual SE 
scenario might require 
landing at China Lake, 
Mojave or Edwards if more 
appropriate (i.e. fire, winds 
aloft).  The Falcon 20 was 
designed to operate from 
fields with limited support, 
thus no HU-25 specific 
offsite landing procedures 
are needed.  The R-2508 
alternate fields (KBIH, KNID, 
KMJV, KEDW) have been 
evaluated for suitability 
(runway length, width, 
crash/fire, etc.).  
  
 
FRR-039 Does the fuel state affect 
the probability of an 
engine stalling or affect 
the ability relight it?  
Should considerations be 
made for when in a flight 
to do the maneuvers with 
the highest risk of 
upsets? 
There is no flight manual 
information on fuel state vs. 
engine behavior or relight 
capability.  Fuel is normally 
moved automatically from 
AUX - WING - FEEDER 
tanks by electric pumps and 
valves and/or differential 
pneumatic pressure.  The 
feeder tanks can be 
selected at either mid or full 
with mid-level as the normal 
position for HU-25 flight.  
The feeder tanks directly 
feed the engine with 
adequate transfer from 
either boost pump or 
fuel state vs. aircraft attitude 
matters 
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pneumatic air with crossfeed 
option from the opposite 
boost pump.  The risk of 
upset is similar regardless of 
when a data run is 
performed in the profile. 
FRR-040 Are the auto slats going 
to be on or off?  The 
dash-1 says to pull the 
CB for the auto slats if an 
air data failure is 
suspected and you are 
above 220KCAS.  Could 
the wake cause what 
looks like an airdata 
failure 
Autoslats are normally on. 
The "air data failure" 
referenced in the question is 
a loss of slat sensor 
redundancy.  The note 
allows for continued flight 
with the CB pulled if above 
220 KIAS so as not to have 
the slats come out at high 
speed and cause damage.  
This can happen if another 
sensor fails.  Caution is 
needed with the CB pulled 
as the clean stall speed is 
now about 10 kts higher.  
This would be a satisfactory 
configuration for sampling 
since we'll be at speeds well 
above stall and have 
sufficient altitude to recover.  
Slat/Speed Protection light 
is common with the HU-25 
fleet and has happened with 
our HU-25.  Sampling with 
this CB pulled will be 
allowable, our checklist 
ensures that it is reset for 
landing.   
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-041 Mission rules for ground 
tests are not captured in 
the mission rules 
document.  Any 
procedural items counted 
on for hazard mitigation 
for ground operations 
should be captured in 
place where they are 
sure to be highlighted in 
all crew briefs. 
 The unsigned draft 
reviewed by the IRT only 
had TBD under hazards.  All 
the hazards associated with 
the ground test are now 
incorporated in the signed 
Ground Test Document as 
well as the approved hazard 
forms. There are no Mission 
Rules associated with the 
ACCESS Ground 
LaRC answer is good. 
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Tests.  Pre-Test briefing for 
the Ground Test will focus 
attention to the hazards, 
safety, and communication 
plans. The Ground test 
procedure has captured all 
hazard mitigations. 
FRR-042 What are the standards 
used for COTS 
equipment acceptance 
for the HU-25 aircraft 
environment? 
COTS research equipment 
is evaluated as part of the 
LARC engineering review 
process for safety but not 
mission assurance.  
Mechanical attachment 
provisions are evaluated 
against the FAR 25 
emergency landing loads by 
mechanical/structural 
engineer and inspected by 
QA.  Electrical provisions 
external to COTS equipment 
are designed by electrical 
engineers and inspected by 
QA.  Provisions for circuit 
protection and emergency 
research equipment power 
cut-off are provided by the 
aircraft's research system 
infrastructure and controlled 
by the pilot through a power 
enable switch.   
Who accepts the risk? 
Permit? 
 
FRR-043 Where is emergency 
equipment located in 
reference to onboard 
personnel? 
Walk-around 100% oxygen 
bottle and quick-donning 
mask is located by the 
forward researcher seat, all 
other seats have 100% crew 
oxygen available.  
Passenger cabin also has 5 
drop down masks.  Fire 
extinguisher by exit door 
and cockpit.  Crash axe in 
cockpit. Grab-n-go survival 
bag containing life support 
equipment by exit door.  A 
first aid kit is in the cabin.  
Removable ELT affixed to 
aux tank accessible to crew 
from cabin. 
LaRC answer is good. 
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FRR-044 Are the aircrew solely 
responsible for 
addressing onboard 
emergencies aft of the 
cockpit, or are other 
personnel also trained for 
that duty? 
Researchers will be briefed 
on crew communication, 
emergency egress and 
emergency equipment 
operation.  Onboard 
emergencies are the pilots' 
responsibility, but recovery 
from an in-flight emergency 
is enhanced by research 
crew awareness of 
emergencies and how to 
assist the PIC if directed. 
Good to brief and practice the 
inflight cabin fire and 
emergency egress on the 
deck. 
 
FRR-045 Is there any intent to 
modify the ACCESS 
systems while at the 
DAOF? 
We will not modify ACCESS 
system design while in the 
field.   Failures or 
malfunctions may require 
removing instruments from 
the HU-25 (or Mobile 
Laboratory) and bringing 
them into the DAOF for 
troubleshooting and repair.  
The instruments will then be 
reinstalled and inspected by 
HU-25 crew before flight.  
The Dryden manager 
assigned to the ACCESS 
project (Chris Jennison) has 
Payload Information Forms 
(PIFs) for both the Falcon 
and Mobile Laboratory and 
should be aware of all 
equipment that could 
potentially be brought to the 
DAOF.   The Falcon payload 
is a subset of the equipment 
Langley installed on the DC-
8 for the recent DC3 
experiment. 
LaRC answer is good. 
 
FRR-046 For the JP-8 and 
Blended Fuel tests, 
where are the separate 
tanks located?  And 
which fuel is in which 
tank? 
DC-8 Center AUX tank has 
the blended fuel.  All other 
tanks will have JP-8.  HU-25 
will always fly with JP-8. 
LaRC answer is good. 
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FRR-047 Explain the 
communication plan 
between aircraft when 
airborne for these 
evaluations. 
The comm plan will be 
presented in the ACCESS 
IRT brief by the project 
team. 
OK 
 
FRR-048 Who leads the tests? The HU-25 is the test 
aircraft and the DC-8 is the 
support aircraft.  In flight 
card management and test 
conduct will be maintained 
by the HU-25 crew and 
principal investigator. DC-8 
will be the formation lead 
and have navigation and 
ATC communications 
responsibilities.  
LaRC answer is good. 
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Appendix J. 2013 Pilot Proficiency Practice Flight Tests Lessons 
Learned 
 
On March 1, 2013, the ACCESS team provided an outbriefing to the NESC team describing pilot 
proficiency flight tests that had been accomplished in accordance with NESC recommendations 
R-1 and R-2.  Videos were shown on a WebEx teleconference and the ACCESS pilots described 
lessons learned.  No written material was received or reviewed by the team.  
 
NESC pre-meeting questions (verbatim) included: 
x -Location, altitude, KIAS, humidity? 
x -Number of wingspans estimated aft of lead aircraft for each run? 
x -Turbulence level before and after establishing position in a contrail? 
x -Sun angle looks like 090 degrees relative. Other angles tried? What is best sun angle for 
contrail visibility? 
x -I tried to ID wingtip vortices rolling up the outboard contrail edges but couldn't. Can 
they see the vortices from above, below, and directly aft? 
x -What was the maximum rolling and pitching force perceived on the controls in pounds? 
x -How many nautical miles did it take to rendezvous, get established, do a run, and exit? 
 
Post meeting comments (verbatim) among the NESC team included: 
x They have the right combination of crew, aircraft, environment, and planning to do their 
mission safely.  
x They had a good tec. Brief… so I expected everything to go well … everything went 
even better that I expected.  
x My measure of comfort is whether or not I'd get in the back of the Falcon and feel 
comfortable.  I think they have demonstrated that there is a comfort level 
there.  Something unexpected could occur, but they have mapped out safe operating 
regions that probably have generalized validity.   
x I have no problem with their continued cautious flying.  As to the vortex encounter -- it's 
kinda hard to know where that cliff really is, since you don't have to be in the core to 
have upset forces applied to the Falcon.   
x In the near field, things appeared exactly as expected, with outboard contrails rolling up 
quickly and making the vorticity very apparent. The inboard contrails were sunk to an 
altitude below the vortices allowing them to sample an inboard exhaust plume safely 
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keeping the Falcon wingtip clear of the vortex. The Falcon roll control appeared very 
easy.  
x In the far field, the separation phenomenon was not clearly visible on the videos. The 
hazard of inadvertent descent into a vortex remains but is mitigated by the ACCESS 
flight rules and the experience gained by the pilots.    
x I am actually kinda surprised that the Falcon didn't experience more unusual forces than 
they did.  It's counter to my experiences.  Good for them.   
x I don't disagree with anything we heard this morning.  I think they have done a good job 
and have a prudent approach to avoid vortex encounters. I do think there is a window of 
opportunity here to validate the methods that we and others used to estimate the effect of 
the trailing vortex on the Falcon.  For example, they could measure the aileron input 
required to maintain the Falcon at wings level and correlate that with position with 
respect to the DC-8 and its wake similar to our color maps of Falcon rolling moment.  I 
realize the project is not interested in this aspect for their science project, but it could be 
very useful to know if the tools are useful and accurate for future projects.   
x I was a little put off on the question about the accel/INS/strain data.  In better times 
NASA would be interested in those data.  
x My concerns are to the project science goals; not safety. ....    These are briefly what I'd 
wonder about.  I have never been convinced that the farfield sampling is a complete 
known.  What are we really sampling in this "upper layer."  If I were the science Program 
Manager I wouldn't go forward without a complete aerochemical multi-species CFD 
simulation to see what this stuff is.  Sure they see exhaust, but is this the "whole" exhaust 
or is there a gravitational or buoyancy or thermal separator in play here?   For the farfield 
cases they showed in the video, there are two visible trails. The inboard and outboard 
exhaust are mixed at this distance.  How do you interpret the data if just the inboard 
engine has the "different" fuel? 
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NASA Press Release: 
 
March 1, 2013 
 
Michael Braukus 
Headquarters, Washington 
202-358-1979 
michael.j.braukus@nasa.gov  
 
RELEASE: 13-066 
 
NASA BEGINS FLIGHT RESEARCH CAMPAIGN USING ALTERNATE JET FUEL 
 
WASHINGTON -- NASA researchers have begun a series of flights using the agency's DC-8 flying laboratory to 
study the effects of alternate biofuel on engine performance, emissions and aircraft-generated contrails at 
altitude.  
 
The Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails and Cruise Emissions 
(ACCESS) research involves flying the DC-8 as high as 40,000 feet while an instrumented NASA Falcon HU-25 
aircraft trails behind at distances ranging from 300 feet to more than 10 miles.  
 
"We believe this study will improve understanding of contrails formation and quantify potential benefits of 
renewable alternate fuels in terms of aviation's impact on the environment," said Ruben Del Rosario, manager of 
NASA's Fixed Wing Project.  
 
ACCESS flight operations are being staged from NASA's Dryden Aircraft Operations Facility in Palmdale, Calif., 
and will take place mostly within restricted airspace over Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.  
 
During the flights, the DC-8's four CFM56 engines will be powered by conventional JP-8 jet fuel, or a 50-50 blend 
of JP-8 and an alternative fuel of hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids that comes from camelina plants.  
 
More than a dozen instruments mounted on the Falcon jet will characterize the soot and gases streaming from 
the DC-8, monitor the way exhaust plumes change in composition as they mix with air, and investigate the role 
emissions play in contrail formation.  
 
Also, if weather conditions permit, the Falcon jet will trail commercial aircraft flying in the Southern California 
region, in coordination with air traffic controllers, to survey the exhaust emissions from a safe distance of 10 
miles.  
 
The flight campaign began Feb. 28 and is expected to take as long as three weeks to complete.  
 
ACCESS follows a pair of Alternative Aviation Fuel Experiment studies conducted in 2009 and 2011 in which 
ground-based instruments measured the DC-8's exhaust emissions as the aircraft burned alternative fuels while 
parked on the ramp at the Palmdale facility.  
 
A second phase of ACCESS flights is planned for 2014. It will capitalize on lessons learned from the 2013 flights 
and include a more extensive set of measurements.  
 
The ACCESS study is a joint project involving researchers at Dryden, NASA's Glenn Research Center in 
Cleveland and NASA's Langley Research Center in Hampton, Va.  
 
The Fixed Wing Project within the Fundamental Aeronautics Program of NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission 
Directorate manages ACCESS.  
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Figure J-1.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: Approaching the Near Field Zone,  
Chase Plane Point of View 
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Figure J-2.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: Approaching the Near Field Zone,  
Falcon Point of View   
 
 
Figure J-3.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: In Near Field, Between  
Inboard Exhaust Plumes   
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Figure J-4.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: Immersed in Right Inboard Exhaust Contrail; Left 
Wingtip Vortex is Made Visible by the Rolled Up Left Outboard Exhaust Contrail; Located to the Left 
and “Centerline At Least One Core Diameter (~6 feet) Above” the Centerline of the Left Inboard 
Exhaust Contrail; Right Wingtip Vortex Obscured  
 
 
Figure J-5.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: Approaching the Far Field  
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Figure J-6.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: Approaching the Far Field; Exhaust Gases 
Separated Above Vortices are not Apparent in Images  
 
Figure J-7.  Pilot Proficiency Practice April 2013: Approximately 300 ft Above the Vortices in Far 
Field; Both Cores are Made Visible by Rolled up Exhaust Contrails 
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